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Following  the basic  philosophical  approach  of  the  LINK  Project, 
which  Links  various  national  econometric  models  built  in different 
countries,  the  Commission  of the  European  Communities  has  succeeded  in 
Linking  the  full  size quarterly econometric  models  of the  four  major 
European  countries.  The  Eurolink  Project  is under  extension to  cover  the 
other  EEC  countries plus the  United  States,  Canada  and  Japan.  The 
results  reported  in this paper  are part of  this  Larger  project, 
which  tries to  Link  together  the  EEC  member  economies  in a  trade and 
capital  flows  econometric  model  and  explain  the  transmission of  inter-
dependent  economic  fluctuations  from  country to  country.  In  the present 
study,  the  interconnection  between  the  various  economies  is  represented 
by  bilateral  trade  flows  only.  Flows  of  invisibles  and  of financial 
capital  are  not  completely  studied  and  are  not  yet  ready  to be  included 
in  this  report. 
The  theoretical  structural  model  with  its bilateral trade  supply 
and  demand  functions  and  the  technique  employed  for  the  construction of 
bilateral  import  and  export  price  indices  are presented.  Estimation 
results  are  shown  and  commented  with  emphasis  on  their use  for  the 
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I  INTRODUCTION 
The  Eurolink  model  is a  system  of  structural econometric  models 
of  the  different  countries of the  European  Economic  Community.  The 
models  are  linked through  bilateral trade  flows  and  bilateral  import-_ 
export  prices.  In  the  near  future,  capital  flows  and  exchange  rate 
linkages  will  be  added.  The  national  models  are built, maintained  and 
·operated by  resident  economists  in  each  EEC  country,  familiar with  local 
institutional behavioural  characteristics and  well  informed  as  to the 
economic  prospects  and  economic  policies  in  their own  country.  The 
individual  models  vary  considerably  in size and  specification from  about 
a  hundred  behavioural  equations  for  the  Italian model  to about  eight 
hundred  for  the  French  one,  and  overall  they  produce  a  system  which  cannot 
be  compared  with  a  centrally structured multinational  model  which  has  a 
uniform  structure across  countries1• 
There  exist different  methods  of  linking  national econometric 
models  by  the  international  trade  sector.  A first one,  the Bilateral 
Direct  Linkage,  assumed  that all countries  linked  together  form  one 
market.  Bilateral trade  flows  are,  then,  directly determined  by  domes-
tic demand  and  price competitiveness  among  all  suppliers,  the domestic 
market  included  (Resnick  and  Truman,  1975;  Berner  et  alii, 1977).  A 
different  approach  is  followed  by  the Trade  Allocation Model  where  the 
problem  to explain bilateral trade  flows  is separated  into two  steps. 
The  first  is  the  allocation of  expenditure  between  domestic  goods  and 
imports.  The  second  step  is the distribution of  commodities  according 
to their geographical  origin.  This  method  allows  one  to abstract  from 
the simultaneous  explanation of the volume  of trade  and  its origin and 
to concentrate only  on  the  latter  (Barten,  1971;  Hickman,  1973). 
1L.R.  Klein,  since 1968  a  pioneer  in this field,  has  provided  the 
basic philosophical  approach  in his  Link  Project. -6-
Finally,  the  World  Trade  Approach  is  largely used  when  infor-
mation  about  bilateral  trade  flows  is not  very  important  for  the  model 
in  hand,  so  that  a  satisfactory and  more  direct picture of  the 
mechanism  which  links  countries  together  is not  required.  This  linkage 
system  determines  the  volume  of world  trade  from  the  weighted  import 
volume  of  each  country.  The  volume  of  each  country's  exports  is, then, 
a  function  of  the  global  volume  of  world  trade,  relative export  prices 
and  other domestic  factors  (Klein  and  Van  Peeterssen,  1973). 
The  Eurolink  system  has  adopted  the  Trade  Allocation  linkage 
model  through  bilateral  merchandise  flows  and  bilateral trade prices 
in  order  to  cover  the  special  relationships  between  very  closely 
interdependent  economies  which  are characteristic of  the  EEC  countries. 
For  policy  making,  this  approach  allows  the possibility to 
measure  the  direct  impact  and  feed-backs  of any  economic  policy taken 
by  an  EEC  country or  partner countries  and,  implicitly,  show  clear 
advantages  for  policy  coordination  at  EEC  level2• 
At  present,  four  major  EEC  countries - France,  Germany,  Italy 
and  the  United  Kingdom  - are part of  the  Eurolink  system  with  full  size 
national  models.  A Rest  of  the  World  model  would  close  the  system. 
The  project  is very  soon  to  be  extended  to  cover  all the other  EEC 
countries plus  the United  States,  Canada  and  Japan. 
The  remainder  of  this  report  is.organised  in five  sections. 
Section  II outlines the  basic  trade  linkage  model;  section III  reports  on 
sources  and  disaggregation  of bilateral data.  Section  IV  introduces 
the  construction of bilateral  import-export  price  indices.  Section  V 
sketches  dynamic  bilateral  linkages.  Section  VI  presents  and  discusses 
the  empirical  results. 
2To  enap~e the  model  builders  living  in their country of or1g1n  to 
operate their model  at  the  Eurolink  Centre  in Brussels,  each  model,  to-
gether  with  its own  solution programme,  is  regularly updated:  this  makes 
it easier  for  each  national  team  to  use  its own  model  directly at  the 
Centre  without  having  to  cope  with  the  differences  in software.  The 
procedure  has  called for  a  main  software programme  which  can  run  all  the 
various  national  solution  programmes  in parallel.  The  Eurolink  Centre  is, 
therefore,  really  responsible  for  the  linkage  model  only. -7-
II  THE  BILATERAL  LINKAGE  MODEL 
Import  and  export  elasticities differ by  type of  commodity  and 
trading  partner.  An  ideal  bilateral  linkage model  based  on  trade  flows 
should  therefore  involve  the  estimation of  a  set of bilateral  import  equa-
tion  (demand  side)  for  every  traded  commodity  for  each  trading  partner, 
as  well  as  a  bilateral  export  function  (supply  side)  for  each  commodity 
traded,  according  to origin and  destination.  Ideally,  the  commodity 
classes  chosen  should  be  as  homogenous  as  possible. 
This  ideal  solution  cannot,  however,  be  realised.  The  number  of 
commodities  to  be  distinguished would  be  so  large  in this  case  that  the 
calculation problems  would  be  insurmountable.  Considerable  aggregation 
and  other  economic  assumptions  to  keep  the  model  within manageable  pro-
portions  are  therefore  inevitable. 
This  paper  reports  on  the  estimation of  a  system  of bilateral 
trade  functions,  while  total  imports  and  total export  prices are produced 
by  national  models  and  therefore  are  exogenous  for  the  linkage  submodel. 
Thus  the  system  can  be  seen  as  an  allocation model  which  explains  changes 
in bilateral trade  flows  as  a  function  of  given  export  prices and  total 
demand  for  imports. 
This  procedure  leaves  out  of  the  linkage  system  the  home 
markets  with  their demand  and  price variables.  The  approach,  based  on 
the  separability hypothesis,  limits the  number  of  variables on  the  right-
hand  side of  the bilateral  import  demand  and  bilateral export  supply 
t .  3  equa  1ons  • 
3In  the  terminology  introduced  by  Strotz  (1957),  a  utility tree 
approach  to the specification  fo  demand  functions  in  foreign  trade first 
determines  total  import  demand  for  any  good  and  then  independently allo-
cates  demand  among  competing  sources of  supply.  Thus,  it is  assumed  for 
present  purposes  that  total  import  demand  and  total export  prices  in 
each  country  have  already been  determined  in the national  models,  and 
only  the  allocation decision  will  be  considered  here. -8-
The  basic  model 
The  basic  model  of  the  demand  for  imports  into country  j  from 
each  partner country i, the  supply  of  exports  from  country  i  to each 
partner  country  j  and  the  bilateral market-clearing  equilibrium can  be 
written formally  as  follows: 
1)  d  d  (m.;  m  ..  = f ..  Pm ..  ;  Pmc ..  ;  v ..  ) 
1)  1J  J  lJ  1J  1J 
2)  s  s  (Px ..  ;  Px.;  u ..  )  X. •  = f .. 
1J  1J  1J  1  1) 
3)  s  d 
X • •  = m  .. 
1)  1) 
The  following  identities hold: 
4)  X  =  l  m 
i  j  i j  total  real  exports of  country  i 
Recording  discrepancies  between  export  and  import  values  and 
actual observed  import  and  export  prices due  to the  fob  (free-on-board) 
and  cif (cost-insurance-freight)  margins  are  ignored. 
The  endogenous  variables are: 
m  ..  =  Imports  demanded  by  country  j  from  country  i  at  constant 
1J 
prices. 
X • • 
1J  = Exports  supplied by  country  i  to country  j  at  constant 
prices • 
Pm ..  = The  price of bilateral  imports  from  country  i  facing 
1) 
demanders  in  country  j  • 
Px ..  =The bilateral export  price  received by  suppliers  in  country 
1) 
i  for  their exports  to  country j. 
Pmc .. =Average  import  price of  the  competitors of  i  in the  market 
1) 
of  country j.  Pmc  is exogenous,  when  only one  pair' of 
equations  (demand  and  supply)  is  considered,  endogenous 
when  the  whole  linkage  model  is used. -9-
The  exogenous  variables are: 
m.  = Total  real  imports  of  country  j  (variable  supplied by 
J 
national  models>~ 
Px.  = Total  export  price  index  of  country  i  (variable  supplied 
1 
by  national  models>~ 
v ..  and  u .. =non-price variables  which  include a  random  dist-
1 J  1 J 
urbance  term. 
This  bilateral  trade  model  describes  the  allocation of all 
imports  :of  goods  as  between  countries of origin.  Therefore  the  sum  of 
the  values  of  all bilateral  imports  by  a  country  is  equal  to the  value 
of  its total  imports: 
7)  M.  =  ~ M  .• 
J  1  1 J 
which  could  be  rewritten as 
8)  m.  Pm.  =  s:  m  ..  Pm .. 
J  J  i  1 J  1] 
Pm.  is  required to satisfy the  relation 
J 
9)  Pm.  =  ~  (m ..  /m.)  Pm .. 
J  i  1]  J  1] 
Bilateral  import  demands  are  specified below  in  logarithmic 
form:  as  shown  in  equation  1>,  the  value  at  constant  prices of  the  demand 
for  bilateral  import  flows  is  related to total  demand  for  imports 
(constant  prices)  and  to  the  bilateral  import  price  index  relative to the 
price  index  of  the  competitors  in  the  same  market. 
For  the  kth  commodity: 
d 
10)  ln  mijk  =  a ..  k  +b. "k  ln 
1]  1]  m.k  +c. "k  ln  Pm ..  k/Pmc. "k  + u ..  k  J  1]  1]  1]  1] 
The  variable  u ..  k  is the  stochastic  disturbance  term  assumed  to 
1] 
be  independently  and  normally  distributed with  zero mean  and  constant 
variance. -10-
As  the  function  is stated  in  Logarithmic  terms,  a. "k'  b ..  k  , J  , J 
and  c ..  k  represent  respectively  a  constant,  the  allocation elasticity 
1J 
and  the  substitution elasticity.  A priori  one  would  expect  b)O  and  · 
c<O.  This  specification is valid  since  the  separability assumption 
recalled above  is  applicable at  any  desired  Level  of  aggregation of  the 
kth  commodity  sector. 
The  equation  is specified  in  Logarithmic  terms  also as  a  matter 
of  convenience,  because  the  formulation  in  Logarithms  enables  us  to 
obtain  constant  elasticities directly,  which  avoids  also  the  problems 
connected  with  Large  changes  in  the  elasticities determined  by  differ-
ences  in the  times  at  which  they  are  evaluated.  Also,  the  logarithmic 
formulation  is suitable because  it avoids  heteroscedasticity problems 
for  estimation of  the  parameters  (Theil,  1971). 
The  Logarithmic  form  of  equation  2,  for  the  kth  commodity  is 
s 
11)  ln  x. "k  = a! "k  + b! "k  Lo  Px ..  + c! "k  Ln  Px.k  +  w.  "k  J1  )1  )1  )1C  )1  1  )1 
The  bilateral  export  supply  in  constant  dollars  is determined 
by  positive price elasticities of  the  bilateral export  price  index  and 
negative price elasticities of  the  price  index  of  total exports of 
country  i  (b 1  )  0  and  c' (  Q),  where  one  can  expect  I b  1 I  =  I  c •) for  reasons 
of  homogeneity. 
Shifts  in export  patterns occur  when  some  markets  offer more 
profitable prices.  Variations  between  the bilateral export  price and  the 
average  total export  price  could  condition  the  exporter's  choice  between 
supplying  country j, and  supplying  other  markets  of destination. 
Each  supplier's export  allocation  function  will  include only the  export-
er's offer price  Px ..  in  the  market  under  consideration  and  the  average 
J 1 
offer price Px.  of the  same  seller  in all  j  markets  where  that  exporter 
1 
can  supply the  same  bundle  of  goods. -11-
The  inclusion of.  a  single  relative price variable  Clb'l=lc•l 
homogeneity  of  degree  zero  in prices)  is  justified by  postulating  that 
the  elasticity of  substitution  has  the  same  value  for  each  pair of 
destinations  of tradeable goods,  i.e.  the  market  under  consideration and 
its competitors.  To  fulfi·l  this  condition,  each  market  must  be  receiving 
(supply  function)  a  similar  mix  of tradeable goods.  The  same,  mutatis 
mutandis,  is true  for  the  demand  function,  where  each  pair of  sources 
has  the  same  value  for  the elasticity of  substitution.  Thus,  an  import-
ant  step  in  empirical  implementation  of  the  model,  as  will be  shown 
later, is to  disaggregate  by  the  same  types  of  commodity  and  to price 
the  same  whole  set of  tradeable products.  This  requifement  is  the  basis 
for  the  construction of  bilateral  and  total  import  and  export  price 
indices. 
Although  a  cursory glance at  the  basic  model  above  might  suggest 
that  total exports oi country  i  have  been  accidentally excluded  as  an 
independent  variable,  the  specification of  the  bilateral export  supply 
function  above  is justified in  several  ways. 
One  of  the  independent  variables  in  the  demand  allocation 
function  for  bilateral  trade  flows  is  the  total amount  of  imports, 
which  is  predetermined  in  each  national  model.  But  a  similar approach 
for·the  export  supply  function,  with  the total  supply of  exports  predeter-
mined  in  the  national  models,  could  well  create more  problems  than  it 
can  solve. 
In  the  national  models,  export  prices  are generally estimated 
as  a  function  of  domestic  costs  and  other  relevant  variables.  Total 
commodity  exports  could  be  derived either  by  an  identity from  the  linkage 
model  as  an  aggregation  over  the bilateral  imports  of  the partner  countries, 
or as  a  function  of  a  total  world  trade variable. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  specification of the bilateral export 
supply  function,  as  written  above,  is based  on  the  assumption  that  the 
elasticity of  supply  of total exports  is  infinite for  total  export  price 
Px.,  predetermined  in the national  models.  Any  reduction  in domestic  , 
capacity utilisation  increases  the potential export  supply  and  lowers -12-
total  export  prices.  Higher  levels of  Px.  reflect  a  higher  domestic  , 
demand  which  is competing  with  the  demand  for  exports. 
At  the  same  time,  Px.  could  be  considered as  an  average  compet- , 
itors' price.  At  that price,  the  exporter  (supplier)  is  willing  to sell 
his  products  to  any  foreign  buyer  (importer).  And,  other things  being 
equal,  he  is  willing  to  switch  supplies  to  wherever  the  relative bilateral 
prices  are  higher. 
Finally,  Px.  should  be  considered as  the  Link  between  the  , 
supply  side of  the  national  models  and  the  Linkage  trade model.  In 
theory,  we  are free to  choose  as  a  link  for  the  supply  side of  the 
national  models  either  x.  (total exports)  or  Px.  (total  export  price),  ,  , 
but  not  both,  because  export  suppliers  cannot  set prices  and  quantities 
at  the  same  time. 
In  practice,  however,  domestic  models  provide  endogenously  only 
the total  export  price Px.,  so  that  there  is no  choice.  , 
Considering  the  whole  linkage model,  as  outlined above,  it is 
easy  to to  see  that  the  system  is exactly  identified: 
there  is  a  pair of  endogenous  variables  (m ..  ,  Pm ..  ),  , J  , J 
where  Pm ..  is equal  to  Px ..  (see  identity 5  above), 
, J  J 1 
for  each  pair of  exogenous  variables  (mj,  Pxi). -13-
III  THE  DATA 
For  the estimation of the  demand  and  supply equations  10) 
and  11>,  the  bilateral  import-export  price  indices are needed.  However, 
they  are not  available, even  at  the  most  aggregate  level. 
This  problem  is  usually solved at  the  aggregate  level  by 
replacing  Pm ..  (bilateral  import  price of  country  j  from  country  i)  by 
1J 
Px.  (bilateral export  price  index  of  country  i>.  However,  the  use  of  , 
the  published series  forM ..  (bilateral  import  flows>,  M.  (total  import 
1 J  J 
flow>,  Px.  (total export  price),  Pm.  <total  import  price)  raises a  few 
1  J 
important  problems  for  the  construction of  the bilateral trade model. 
First of all, the  use  of aggregates  might  give  undue  weight  to goods 
with  relatively  low  elasticities,  like  imports  of  fuels  and  raw  materials. 
Second,  if the  published series are  used  as  proxies  for  the 
bilateral prices,  the  identity  7> 
~ M  ••  =  M. 
1  1 J  J 
will  not  be  satisfied. 
Last,  but  not  least, acceptable  estimates  for  the  coefficients 
are  not  obtained,  unless  constraints on  the  coefficients are  imposed 
as  in  Barten  (1971). 
Thus,  to produce  reliable  results,  disaggregated equations  are 
needed  and  ad  hoc  bilateral trade price  indices should  be  used. 
In  view  of all these  problems,  the  ideal  level  of  commodity 
aggregation  should  involve  a  degree of detail  fine  enough  to allow 
identification of goods  which  are  perfectly homogeneous,  regardles~ of 
origin of production.  In  such  a  breakdown,  all_ components  of  the  same 
set  could  be  regarded  as  perfect  substitutes.  With  this  kind  of data, 
bilateral price  indices  can  be  constructed and  disaggregated equations 
estimated. -14-
For  this  purpose,  OECD  bilateral trade data  were  used.  The 
OECD  provides  quarterly  import  and  export  data  in  both  quantity and 
value  terms  based  on  the  Standard  International  Trade  Classification 
(SITC)  Revised  (UN,  1975),  for  the  24  OECD  countries. 
A complete  classification by  trading  partner  country  (204 
countries)  is given.  The  data  cover  the  years  1963  to the  most  recent 
year  available:  ai  present  1980.  In  the  SITC,  data  cover  1696  itemso 
Import  values  are  cif and  export  values  are  fob,  all  in dollars. 
Quantities are  expressed  in metric  units.  The  data  used  to  construct 
bilateral price  indices  are,  then,  unit  values,  i.e.  values  per  unit 
of quantity within  the  Standard  International  Trade  Classification of 
imports  and  exports. -15-
IV  BILATERAL  IMPORT-EXPORT  PRICE  INDICES 
As  Frisch  (1936)  pointed out,  the  probtem  of  how  to  construct 
a  price  index  number  is  a  much  one  of economic  theory as  of statistical 
technique.  From  the  economic  point  of  view,  there  is no  ideal  price 
index.  The  best  index  should  be  constructed  in the  context  of a  given 
model  and  its use.  For  the  linkage  model  outlined above,  the first 
requirement  for  bilateral  trade price  indices  is that  the different 
commodities  should  be  weighted  on  the basis  of  the  country's geographical 
trade  composition.  Otherwise,  it would  be  impossible  to.determine 
whether  a price  change  is the  result of price movements  or variations 
in  the weights  of goods  whose  price movements  are  identical.  These  are 
well-known  problems  of  the  choice  between  weighting  according  to a 
base  period  (time-to-time  indices)  and  weighting  according  to a  regional 
trade pattern at  a  given  moment  (place-to-place  indices). 
This  problem  does  not  arise  in  the  case of  the  Eurolink  Linkage 
model.  Weights  are for  each  period  in  terms  of  the  importing  (exporting> 
country,  that  is  in  terms  of a  third  region  which  is  independent  of  the 
countries  involved  in  the  comparisons.  Bilateral price  indices  for  each 
particular partner  country  in  each  different  market  are determined.by 
an  averaging  process  in which  each  commodity  has  a  weight  proportionate 
to its share  in the  total trade  market  of  the  importing  or exporting 
country  for  each  year.  In  practice,  as  we  shall  see  below,  the  construc-
tion of  the bilateral unit  value  indices  involves  building  indices  using 
the  current  period as  weight,  which  is the  Paasche  Index  formula.  But 
instead of each  partner  country  using  its own  commodity  weight  for  each 
bilateral  index,  a  common  weight  (total share of  the  item  in the  report-
ing  country's total volume  of  trade)  is used. 
When  a  country does  not  export  a  particular  item  (for example, 
because  it could  be  produced  only at  higher  prices>,  the  requirement 
for  all  international goods  to be  priced  was  satisfied by  taking  the 
marginal  bilateral  import  price, that  is the  highest  bilateral  import 
price.  Where  there  is only one  exporter  (perhaps  because  of natur.al 
resources)  and  competition  is then  ruled out, attribution of the  same 
single price to all partner countries  should  produce  a  fair  comparison. -16-
Mutatis  mutandis,  the  same  is true for  the  construction of 
bilateral export  price  indices to be  used  for  the  supply  equation  of 
the  linkage  model.  Import  data  on  a  cif basis  were  used  to  compute 
the  bilateral price  indices for  import  demand  equations;  for  supply 
equations,  export  data  must  be  expressed  fob.  In  the  import  demand 
function,  the buyer  should  compare  net  expenditures.  In  the  supply 
function,  the seller (supplier)  is  interested in determining-which 
market  yields  the  highest  net  proceeds  for  the  same  basket  of  export 
products.  Net  proceeds  to the  seller are best measured  by  fob  data, 
since  insurance  and  freight  costs  (cif)  differ according  to destination. 
The  requtrement  for  all  international goods  to be  priced  has  been 
satisfied by  attributing  the  lowest  bilateral export  price to  the partner 
country of destination  when  exports were  nil:  the  supplier tries to 
shift his export  goods  where  he  is paid the  higher  prices  for  the  same 
set of commodities.  When  demand  is restricted to a  single  importer, 
the  exporter  has  no  choice,  and  competition  among  markets  of  destination 
is  ruled out.  In  this  case,  the  same,  single price is attributed to 
every  partner  country. 
To  build  import-export  price  indices,  import-export  unit  values 
have  to be  calculated at  the finest  level  of  disaggregation.  The 
elementary unit  value  is  the  ratio between  the  value  Vk  and  the  quantity 
Qk  of  each  kth  flow  at  period t. 
12>  vkt  =  u 
Qkt  kt 
The  price  index  (unit  value  index>  is obtained by 
13)  ukt  =  Pkt 
uk70 
where  ukt  is  the  unit  value  of  the  current  period  for  item  k 
and  uk70  is the  unit  value  for  the  same  item  in the  base  year,  1970. 
For  the  period 1963-1969,  items  at  the  four  digit  level  of  the  SITC 
are  used,  for  the  period 1970-1980,  the  five digit  level,  covering 
approximately  1699  items,  is employed. -17-
Commodities  are  aggregated  by  using  current  weights  in  volume 
terms.  If X is the trade  flow  (import-export>  in value  and  x  the  trade 
flow  in volume,  weights  are defined  as 
Total  aggregate price  indices  thus  take the  form 
which  are  current  weighted  Paasche  Index  numbers.  Paasche  Index  numbers 
are  currently written as 
16]  ~ qkt  pkt 
t qkt  pk70 
Formula  15)  is  in fact  the  same  as  formula  16>;  where  the 
q1s  are  current  trade  flows  in  volume.  To  show  that this is the  case, 
definition 13)  should  be  substituted in 15): 
where  the quantities q of  the  Paasche  formula  are  replaced by  x,  the 
trade  flow  in  volume  terms.  Commodities  for  the bilateral and  total 
unit  price  indices are aggregated  by  using  formula  15>  which  is~ as 
shown,  equivalent  to a  Paasche  Index  number. -18-
V  A DYNAMIC  LINKAGE  MODEL 
Price  changes  could  have  relatively slow  effects on  market 
shares:  there  may  be  recognition,  decision,  delivery and  production  lags. 
On  the other  hand,  by  its nature  there are no  lags  in the  relationship 
between  total  import  demand  m.  and  the bilateral flow  m  ..• 
J  1J 
Therefore,  if  lags  are  introduced  in the  model  described  above, 
they  should  refer to  the price term  only. 
The  most  popular  form  of  lag  distribution  is a  geometric  lag 
distribution,  which  can  be  rationalized by  the  familiar  adaptive 
expectation  model  (Kmenta,  1971). 
The  bilateral  import  demand  equation  can  then be  rewritten: 
e  18)  l n  m  ..  k = a ..  k  + b ..  k  l n  m  . k  +  c ..  k  l n  (  Pm ..  k  I Pm c ..  k) 
1J  1J  1J  J  1J  1J  1] 
e  where  (Pm ..  k/Pmc ..  k)  is the  expected price  ratio. 
1]  1) 
The  expected price  ratio  is determined  by: 
19)  ln  (Pm ..  k/Pmc ..  k)e =  Aln  (Pm ..  k/Pmc ..  k)et  1  1)  1]  1]  1]  -
+  (1-A>  ln  (Pm ..  k/Pmc ..  k)  +  u2  1 J  1 J 
Current  expected price  ratios  are determined by  modifying 
previous  expectations  in the  light of  current  experience.  Next,  the 
expected price ratio 19)  can  be  incorporated  in  18): 
+  c ..  k(1-,\)  ln(Pm ..  k/Pmc ..  k)  + u 
1J  1J  1] - 19-
which  by  use  of  the  Koyck  transformation  (Koyck,  1954)  Lagging  18) 
can  be  rewritten as 
21)  Ln  m.  "k 
1]  = a ..  k(1->v  + b ..  k  Ln  m.k- b .• k Aln  m.kt  1  1]  1]  J  1J  J  -
+  c. "k  (1-A)  Ln  CPm ..  k/Pmc ..  k)  + Aln  m. "k  +  u 
1]  1]  1]  1]  t-1 
Because  of  non-Linearities,  this  specification  requires non-
Linear  estimation procedures.  The  supply  equation  is, on  the  contrary, 
Linear  in the  Logarithms  and,  after some  rearrangement  of  terms,  takes 
the  form 
+).. Ln  X  •• k  + u 
,J  t-1 -W-
VI  EMPIRICAL  RESULTS 
Regression  results  are  not  reported  in this abridged  version 
of  the  paper  because  of  lack  of  space,  but  can  be  obtained on  request 
from  the  author.  The  following  paragraphs  and  synoptic  tables  summarise 
the  main  conclusions  of  economic  significance  for  four  reporting  count-
ries  (France,  Germany,  Italy and  the  UK).  Partner  countries  are  the 
same  four  countries plus  the  Rest  of  the World. 
In  general,  it has  emerged  that  allocation  coefficients  (b's) 
are  around  one;  and  substitution elasticities (c's)  are negative  and 
show  very  Low  values  for  basic  materials  (SITC  2-4)  and  mineral  fuels 
(SITC  3). 
Allocation elasticities  (b  coefficients>4 
Tables  1,  2,  3  and  4 present  the  import  distribution elasticities 
by  origin for  each  reporting  country  (France,  Germany,  Italy and  the  UK). 
The  column  headings  indicate the  importing  country,  and  allocation elas-
ticities are given  with  respect  to  the partner  exporting  ~ountry appear-
ing  in  the  row  entry. 
Allocation elasticities larger  than  one  ()1)  show  growing  market 
shares  for  the  exporting  countries  <row  entries)  in the  import  market 
of  each  of  the  four  countries  considered. 
4Market  share time  series are  a  common  tool  to  analyse  international 
trade  for  policy making.  Allocation elasticity estimates  should  be 
considered  a  more  refined  and  subtle approach  to  the  same  problem.  Being 
the  result of  an  economic  model  and  of multiple  regression  techniques, 
these elasticities can  be  used  to distinguish  the effects of  changes 
in  demand  from  the effects of  changes  in  supply  as  well  as  of price 
competitiveness  and  other factors.  On  the other hand,  the  usual  market 
share  time  series cannot  be  of  much  help  to  the policy maker,  who  needs 
a  few  key  and  summary  figures  for  action.  The  bilateral trade model 
presented  here  has  already  been  used  by  the  EEC  Delegation  in Geneva 
for  the  assessment  of  the  effects of  the  various tariff cutting  formulas 
during  the  Tokyo  Round  of  Trade  Negotiations  within the  framework  of  the 
General  Agreement  on  Tariff and  Trade  (GATT)  (P.  Ranuzzi,  1978). -21-
Table  1  reports allocation elasticities for  food,  beverages 
and  tobacco  (SITC  0-1).  France,  with  a  very  low  import  allocation 
elasticity vis-a-vis Germany  and  elasticities lower  than  one  for  Italy 
and  the  UK,  is  apparently  turning  away  from  the  EEC  member  countries 
and  towards  the  Rest  of  the  World  as  a  source of this category of 
imports.  The  size of the  export  share of  the  Rest  of the World  in  the 
French  agricultural  importing  market  is growing  at a  rate of  5%  a  year, 
abstracting  from  price substitution effects. 
Germany  also  shows  low  food  import  allocation elasticities 
in  respect  of  its  EC  partners,  with  an  exception  for  the  UK.  UK  acces-
sion  to the  EEC  has  probably  led  to  a  reduction  in German  agricultural 
imports  from  the  EEC  founder  members  in  favour  of  the British agricul-
tural exporting  market. 
The  figures  for  imports  of agricultural goods  by  Italy are 
strikingly different  from  those of  France  and  Germany.  Allocation elas-
ticities are  substantially higher  than  unity for  the  EEC  partners,  and 
lower  than  one  for  imports  form  the  Rest  of  the  World,  which  implies  a 
substantial  agricultural  trade  creation effect  between  Italy and  its 
EEC  partners. 
The  UK  import  allocation elasticities are not so  clear-cut, 
because  to get  meaningful  results  for  the bilateral  import  equations 
from  Germany  and  Italy,  the  coefficients  have  been  assumed  to  be  equal 
to one.  But  the  Rest  of the  World  is probably  increasing  its share of 
food  exports  to  the  UK  market,  which  shows  an  import  allocation elas-
ticity of  1.14. 
Table  2  for  basic  materials  (SITC  2-4)  shows  an  EEC  trade 
creation effect  in  the  French  importing  market  for  the three  EEC  export-
ing  countries  (Germany,  Italy and  UK),  while  the  Rest  of  the World  is 
losing  ground.  The  same  can  be  said for  the  Ita~an import  market.  The 
share of  French  eKporters  in the  German  market  is  increasing,  while 
that  of  Italian exporters  is declining slightly;  the  UK  and  the  Rest  of 
the  World  hold  their positions  in  the  German  market. -n-
The  UK,  on  the other  hand,  shows  a  diversion of this type of 
trade  from  the three  EEC  partner  exporting  countries  in  favour  of  the 
Rest  of  the  World. 
Table  3  (SITC  3,  mainly  oil)  is not  very  interesting  because, 
as  expected,  allocation elasticities vis-a-vis the  Rest  of  the  World 
are practically one,  and  the  imports  of oil  from  the  Rest  of  the  World 
represent  almost  90%  of  the  market  share  in  each  importing  country. 
Germany's  very  high  allocation elasticity vis-a-vis the  UK,  which  is  an 
exception,  could  be  explained by  the  recent  discovery and  exploitation 
of  the British  North  Sea  oilfields. 
Results  in Table  4  (manufactured  goods,  SITC  S-9),  are quite 
interesting.  France  and  Germany  have  been  diverting their  import  trade 
since 1970  from  the  EEC  founder  members  towards  the  UK,  a  new  memberp 
and  the  Rest  of  the World.  French  and  German  import  allocation elast-
icities are  lower  than  one  vis-a-vis  the  EEC  founder  members  exporting 
to their markets  and  larger  than  one  vis-a-vis the  UK  and  the  Rest  of 
the  World. 
On  the other  hand,  France  seems  to  be  increasing  its share 
quite substantially in the  Italian and  British markets  for  manufactured 
goods;  elasticities are  1.21  and  1.30  respectively.  German  exports 
seem  to  be  losing ground  in all three  EEC  member  countries.  Italy's 
share of  the market  is decreasing  in  Germany  and  France,  but  increasing 
in the  UK. 
The  UK,  most  probably  because  of  recent  accession  to the  EEC, 
is gaining  market  shares  in  France  and  Germany,  but  not  yet  in  Italy. 
Elasticities of  substitution  (c  coeffictents> 
Tables  5,  6,  7  and  8  show  elasticities of  subst~tution, which 
can  be  seen  as  measure  of  the  degree of  monopoly  of  the  suppliers 
(exporters)  in  each  importing  market. T
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Elasticities of  substitution of  Less  than  one  CC <  1)  show  that 
the  importing  country  cannot  easily switch  from  one  supplier to another. 
If the  exporter  raises prices  by  one  percent,  an  inelastic substitution 
means  that  the  importing  country  reduces  its bilateral  import  quantity 
from  that  supplier by  Less  than  one  percent.  As  a  consequence,,  the 
total  amount  of money  spent  on  the bilateral  import  flow  increases  while 
the bilateral trade  volume  of  imports  decreases. 
The  exporter's degree of  price monopoly  in  any  importing  market  is 
absolute  when  completely  inelastic substitution  is  found.  Given  the 
total quantty imported,  any  price  increase  decide~  by  the  exporter  is 
fully borne  by  the  importer.  The  importing  country,  in fact,  cannot 
switch  demand  to  any  other  supplier  with  Lower  prices, because  the exist-
ing  supplier  has  complete  control  over  the  supply  in the  importing 
market.  Elasticities of substitution go  beyond  nominal  price  compet-
itiveness,  which  refers  to  higher  or  Lower  Levels  of  relative prices 
only.  By  measuring  each  exporter's degree·of price monopoly,  relative 
to all other  competitors  in  the  same  importing  market,  elasticities of 
substitution tell us  something  about  the  segmentation  of  the market  and 
the monopolistic  control  established  in the  importing  market. 
Table  5  shows  elasticities of substitution for  food,  beverages 
and  tobacco  (SITC  0-1).  The  row  entries  show  that  France  still retains 
a  certain degree  of  monopoly  in  the  Italian and  German  foods  markets, 
but  not  in  the British  market.  Germany  shows  a  very  small  degree of 
monopoly  in all three  food  importing  marketsof  the  EEC:  France,  Italy 
and  the  UK.  Italy controls  the  German  market,  perhaps  because  of  its 
traditional  role  as  a  fruit  and  vegetable  exporter,  but  has  to fight 
hard  to  be  price  competitive  in  the  French  and  British food  markets. 
For  instance,  in  the  UK,  all other  things  being  equal,  Italy would  have 
to  Lower  agricultural prices  by  2 percent  to  increase its bilateral 
trade  flow  by  one  percent  (the  UK's  total bill towards  Italy will 
decrease  if Italy tries to expand  the  volum~ of  exports  to  the British 
food  import  market  by  cutting prices). -25-
The  UK  shows  no  degree  of  monopoly  in the  importing  markets  of 
the other  three  EEC  member  countries  and  its price competitiveness  is 
weakened  especially  in  France  and  Germany  by  a  high  import  elasticity 
of  substitution,  where  to enlarge  its export  flow  by  one  percent,  it 
would  have  to  lower  its price by  more  than  two  percent. 
For  France  and  Italy,  as  importing  countries,  the elasticities 
of  substitution  reported  in Table  5 are  short-run elasticities. 
Long  run elasticities (see Appendix)  can be found by dividing the short run 
substitution coefficients  by  <1-X)  ,  where  A is  the  lag  operator.  In 
the  ~rench agricultural  importing  market,  Germany  and  the  UK  as  exporters 
show  very  high  elasticities of  substitution with  coefficients of  4.18 
and  7.31  respectively.  Italy presents a  long-run  coefficient of  2.68 
which  is  much  lower  than  those of  Germany  and  the  UK,  but  still too 
high  to  imply  any  control  of  the  French  agricultural market  in the  long 
run.  Only  the R·est  of  the  World,  with  a  long  run  elasticity of  substit-
ution  of  less  than  one  (0.77), presents  some  monopolistic  power  in the 
French  food  importing  market. 
Italy,  as  a  long  run  food  importer,  presents a  pattern similar 
to that of  France,  but  with  smaller  substitution  coefficients.  The 
three biggest  EEC  exporters of agricultural  products  to Italy have  little 
long  run  control  over  the  Italian food  importing  market,  but  the  Rest 
of  the  World  has  a  fairly  high  degree  of  control. 
Table  6  refers  to  basic  materials  (SITC  2-4).  Member  countries 
have  no  control  over  the  markets  in  the other  member  importing  countries. 
Only  France  and  Germany  present  some  monopoly  power  in the  Bri~ish 
importing  market.  The  Rest  of  the World,  on  the other  hand,  shows,  as 
expected,  a  high  degree  of monopoly  (represented by  an  elasticity of 
substitution almost  equal  to  zero)  in  every  importing  market  of  the 
EEC  member  countries. 
Table  7  (mineral  fuels,  SITC  3), is not  very  ~mportant for  the 
European  countries,  because  as  exporters of  mineral  oils and  other e
n
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fuels,  their production  capacity  is  very  limited.  Only  the  UK  is  able 
to  control  the oil market  in  the  same  way  as  the  Rest  of  the  World. 
Table  8  (manufactured goods,  SITC  5-9)  presents striking differ-
ences  among  the  European  countries.  In  the  Italian  importing  market 
for  industrial goods,  all  suppliers  reported  in  the  Table  are  able  to 
control  the market;  i.e.  import  elasticities of  substitution for  Italy 
are  well  below  one  whichever  supplier  we  look  at.  It could  be  said that 
exporters  have  been  very  successful  in  segmenting  the  Italian  importing 
market  by  eliminating  chances  of price competitiveness between  themselves. 
France  as  an  exporter  is  in  a  very  strong  position  in  Italy,  a  fairly 
favourable  position  in  the  UK,  but  a  weak  position as  a  price monopolist 
in  the  import  market  of  Germany,  where  the bilateral elasticity of 
substitution  is  well  above  unity. 
Germany  as  an  exporter  is  in  a  stronger position  than  France  in 
the  Italian importing  market,  a  weak  position  in  France,  and  average  in 
the  UK  with  a  coefficient  very  close to one. 
The  UK  shows  its weakness  in  the  import  markets  of  France  and 
Germany,  but  is  in  a  favourable  position  in  Italy. 
Italy is  a  very  weak  exporter of  manufactued  goods  in every market 
and  must  lower  its export  prices quite substantially if it is to  raise 
its export  flows  to  France,  Germany  and  the  UK.  Italy,  as  a  consequence, 
could  be  said to be  a  weak  international trader,  insofar as  prices  are 
concerned,  both  as  an  importer  and  as  an  exporter of  manufactured  goods 
vis-a-vis  the  largest  countries of  the  EC. 
Bilateral price eguations 
No  acceptable  results  were  obtained for the bilateral supply 
equation  as  described  in  11)  in  o.l.s. estimation.  Two-stage  least 
squares  estimates  were  also  unsuccessful.  No  solution has  yet  been  found 
therefore,  for  the  estimation of  the  structural  coefficients of the bi-
lateral  supply  flow  model.  But  the  equilibrium price  can  also  be  expressed -28-
in terms  of  the  underlying  supply  and  demand  factors  and  this expression 
can  be  placed  in  the  model  instead of  supply  and  market-clearing 
equations.  The  explicit  expression  for  the bilateral price variable 
which  appears  in both  equations  (demand  and  supply)  becomes: 
Pm .. = a 1  + b 
1  m.  +  c'  Pc .. + d  1  ( Px.  r ..  )  + e  1  t ..  +  f 1  X.  .  +  w  .. 
1J  J  1J  1  1]  1]  ]1t-1  1] 
where  all  variables  are  expressed  in  logarithms.  r ..  and  t ..  are cif-
1]  1] 
fob  adjustment  factors,  which  are  defined  as  r ..  =  Pm ..  /Px ..  and 
1]  1]  1] 
t .. =  m  ..  /x ..  to take  into account  all  kinds  of discrepancies between 
1J  1J  1] 
recorded  import  and  export  trade  flows.  In  fact,  cif-fob conversion 
factors  are not  the only  source  of discrepancies  between  bilateral  import 
and  export  flows.  Transport  lags,  redirections of trade,  errors  etca  are 
also  involved. 
From  the  expected  sign  of  the  coefficients  in  the  structural 
model,  we  could  expect  the  coefficients of  the  reduced  form  equation  of 
the bilateral price variable to  be  positive forb', c'  and  d 1  ()0),  and 
negative fore'  and  f 1  ((0).  There  is  no  need  to explain  the positive 
effect of  the first  three variables  and  the  negative  sign  for xijt-1  (the 
bilateral  supply  quantity  lagged  one  period), but  the  negative  effect  of 
the  cif-fob adjustment  factor  t ..  might  be  somewhat  surprising.  In  fact, 
1] 
t ..  is the  ratio of bilateral  imports  to  export  flows  in  constant  terms, 
1J 
i.e.  US  1970  dollars.  The  variable.t ..  is, then,  free  from  inflation. 
1] 
Increases  in productivity  in the  insurance  and  transport  sectors  would 
decrease·tij  and  also  reduce  import  prices.  For  reasons  of price  homo-
geneity,  the  sum  of  the  coefficients of  the  two  price explanatory variables 
has  been  set  equal  to one  (c+d  = 1). 
Moreover,  in the  reduced  form,  the  coefficient of  the  variable 
for  total export  price of  country  iCPx.)  and  of  the  variable  for  the 
1 
price adjustment  factor  rij  should  be  equal,  as  is  shown  by  the  structural 
model.  Estimations  were  made  first  without  constraints and  then  subject 
to constraints.  Generally,  estimations  with  and  without  constraints 
have  shown  the  same  results.  In  a  very  few  cases,  unconstrain~d results 
have  turned out  to be  more  acceptable  from  the  econometric  point  of  view 
than  the  estimation  with  the  constraints.  In  these  cases,  estimations 
without  constraints  have  been  chosen  and  reported  in the  tables below. -29-
A few  brief  remarks  about  the  economic  interpretation of the 
reduced  form  equation  for  the bilateral  importpric~ function  are needed.  The 
classical  theory which  relates price setting  to the equilibrium between 
supply  and  demand  explains  the  dynamics  of the bilateral export  pricing 
of the  reduced  form  equation.  Estimation  results  show  that  the bilateral 
export  pr1c1ng  behaviour  of  each  country  vis-a-vis its importing  partners 
at  the  aggregate  level  is  largely explained  by  two  variables:  an  average 
export  price as  expressed  by  variable Px.  and  the price  index  Pc ..  ,  1J 
charged  by  competitors  in  the  same  importing  market  for  the  same  category 
of products.  Px.  (the average  export  price  index)  in the  national  models  , 
is mainly  the  result of  an  equation  based  on  domestic  cost  considerations. 
The  elasticity coefficients of the  two  variables  Px.  and  Pc ..  may  be  ,  , J 
interpreted as  proxies  to  measure  price discrimination as  discussed by 
J.  Robinson  (1969),  if the monopolistic  exporter tries to maximize  total 
profit on  each  exporting  market.  The  elasticity coefficients estimated 
for  the  two  variables  should,  then,  show  two  different  behaviours:  the 
country  exporting  to  a  particular  importing  market  can  behave  as  a  price 
maker  and  base  its bilateral export  price on  its average  export  price 
Pxi  (based  on  domestic  cost  consideration), or it could  be  a  price taker, 
and  choose  to adjust  its bilateral export  price to its competitors' 
prices.  If the  exporting  country  is a  price taker  in  a  particular market, 
the expected  coefficient of  the  competitors'  price variable  should  be 
very  close to one  and  the  coefficient of  the  average  export  price should 
be  close to zero.  If,  on  the other  hand,  the  exporting  country  is  a 
price maker,  the opposite will  hold. 
It  is  unlikely that  every  exporting  country  is free  to  choose 
one  or other  extreme  situation;  most  will  find  themselves  somewhere  in 
between.  The  coefficients measuring  the  degree  of price setting behav-
iour  (price  discriminati~n among  different  exporting  markets)  could 
thus  take  any  value  between  zero  and  one,  depending  on  the  competitive-
ness  of the  country and  on  characteristics  such  as  market  shares,.changes 
in market  shares,  specialisation,  aggressivity,  etc. -30-
Since  the  price homogeneity  condition  (that  the  sum  of  the  two  coeffic-
ients  should  be  equal  to one)  has  been  imposed  for  estimation of  the 
coefficients,  tables 9,  10,  11  and  12  show  only  the elasticity coeffic-
ient  for  the  average  export  price variable  (coefficient d').  The 
elasticity coefficient  for  the  competitors'  price variable  can  easily 
be  computed  by  subtracting  from  one  the  coefficient  given. 
Table  9  gives  the  results  for  agricultural  products  (SITC  0-1). 
The  row  entries present  the elasticities of  the  exporting  countries 
vis-a-vis the  importing  countries  shown  in the  column  headings.  In 
agricultural exports,  France,  Germany  and  the  UK  are price makers 
because  they  show  elasticity coefficients  for  their  average  export  price 
variable  rather  close  to one.  All  three exporting  countries  are  able  to 
set  their bilateral export  prices,  especially  in the  Italian agricultural 
importing  market,  almost  without  considering  the price policies of  their 
competitors.  In  the  UK's  importing  market,  France  and  Germany,  with 
coefficients of  only  0.59  and  0.53  respectively,  have  less  scope  for 
price setting behaviour,  perhaps  because  the  UK  has  been  participating 
for  so  short  a  time  in  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy:  the  UK  did  not 
join the  EEC  until  1973,  while  the  estimation period begins  in  1970. 
Italy,  on  the other  hand,  is a  price taker  in  France  (0.26)  and  the  UK 
(0.24)  and  a  price maker  in  Germany  (0.58)  but  with  little room  for 
manoeuvre.  These  results  confirm  what  has  already been  said about  the 
elasticities of  substitution  above,  and  it is worth  noticing  that all 
J 
these  results,  although  estimated separately,  are mutually  consistent. 
Table  10  presents  results  for  basic  materials  (SITC  2-4).  France 
and  Germany  are  export  price setters  in  all  importing  markets,  while  the 
UK  and  Italy,  with  very  low  elasticity coefficients are price takers. 
It should  be  borne  in mind  that  the average  export  price  (Px.)  of  the 
1 
Rest  of  the World  includes  only  the  export  prices of  the other  OECD 
countries,  and not those  of  the  LDCs,  OPEC  countries  and  so  on.  This 
is because  the  data  bank  used  contains  export  price data  from  the  OECD 
countries only.  On  the other  hand,  the  competitors'  import  prices 
(Pc ..  )  do  cover  every  country of  the  Rest  of  the  World  because  the  lJ 
countries  reporting··to  the  OECD  data  bank  trade with  all of  the  world 1s -31-
trading  countries  (204  countries).  This  accounts  for  the  very  low 
coefficients of  the  Rest  of  the  World,  which  could  be  expected to be  a 
price maker  at  least  in  SITC  category  2-4  (basic  materials)  and  category 
3  (mineral  fuels). 
Table  12  shows  the  results  for  manufactured  goods  (SITC  S-9). 
France  and  Germany  are price makers  in all the  importing  markets  consid-
ered  up  to  now  in  the  Eurolink  project.  Italy has  a  very  high  coefficient 
(0.74)  in one  importing  market  only,  that  of  the  UK,  but  presents  an 
average  coefficient(around  0.50)  in  the  French  and  German  import  market. 
The  UK,  as  an  exporter,  shows  some  price discrimination behaviour  only 
in the  French  importing  market  for  manufactured  goods,  but  not  in German 
and  Italian markets.  The  Rest  of  the  World,  which  includes  the  US  and 
Japan,  seems  to  be  free  to  apply  an  independent  export  price policy  in 
the  British  importing  market  for  manufactured goods,  but  its coefficients 
are  very  low  in  France,  Germany  and  Italy,  where  the Rest  of  the  World 
could  be  said to  be  essentially a  price taker. T
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VII  SUMMARY  OF  THE  MOST  IMPORTANT  FINDINGS 
By  looking  at allocation  and  substitution elasticities and  at 
the  price setting behaviour  of  the  four  countries at present  incorpor-
ated  in the  Eurolink  system,  some  general  conclusions  can  be  drawn. 
For the agricultural  trade sector,  France  and  Germany  seem  to 
be  in  a  very  strong position.  These  two  countries are able to set their 
prices  in  the  agricultural  importing  market  of  Italy and  the  UK  without 
much  competition  from  the other exporters on  the  same  markets.  The 
story  looks  different  for  the  UK,  but  above  all, for  Italy.  Italy, as 
a  food  exporter  is essentially a  price taker.  The  UK  seems  to be  a  price 
setter, but  agricultural  trade goods  of  UK  origin show  very  high  substit-
ution elasticities.  Moreover,  France  and  Germany  present  a  trade 
diversion  effect  from  the  EEC  member  countries  in  favour  of  the  Rest  of 
the  World.  The  opposite  seems  to be  true  for  Italy and  the  UK. 
For  basic  materials only  the  UK  shows  some  trade diversion  effect 
from  member  countries to the  Rest  of  the  World.  On  the other  hand, 
France  and  Germany  look  to  be  price setters, and  Italy and  the  UK  price 
takers. 
For  enetqy  traded  good~, only the  Rest  of  the  World  shows  a  price 
setting  behaviour,  as  expected,  by  controlling  90  percent  of  the  import-
ing  markets. 
Finally,  for  manufactured  goods,  it  looks  like there  is still 
an  EEC  trade  creation effect  for  French  traded goods  in the  Italian and 
British  markets,  and  for  UK  manufactured  exports  in the  French  and  German 
markets.  At  the  same  time,  France,  Germany  and  Italy seem  to be  price 
setters  in  the  EEC  importing  markets  for  industrial goods,  with  the 
exception of  Italian exports  to  Germany.  UK  industrial exports  look 
strong  in  the  French  importing  market,  but  rather  weak  in the German  and 
Italian ones.  The  Rest  of  the  World  seems  to be  a  price setter in the 
UK  with  almost  no  competition  from  other exporters  in  the  same  market, 
but  is a  price taker  in  France,  Germany  and  Italy. -34-
Appendix 
The  dynamic  model  presented  in  Section  V has  been  applied  to 
all bilateral equations,  but  has  shown  )\coefficients different  from 
zero  only  for  agricultural  imports  (SITC  0-1)  of  France  and  Italy. 
The  following  tables presents  the  Long-run  substitution elastic-
ities for  those  two  countries  as  agricultural  importers,  compared  to 
the  short-run substitution elasticities already  reported  in  Table  5. 
Short  and  long-run  substitution elasticities  (c  coefficients) 
(food,  beverages  + tobacco  -SITC  0-1)  Sample  period  1970-78,  quarterly 
figures 
FRANCE  (importer)  ITALY  (importer) 
Exporters  short-run  long-run  Exporters  short-run  long-run 
elasticities elasticities  elasticities elasticities 
FR  - - FR  -0.73  -1.5 
GE  -0.92  -4.18  GE  -0.96  -2.0 
IT  -1.42  -2.68  IT  - -
UK  -2.12  -7.31  UK  -1.24  -1.82 
RW  -0.38  -0.77  RW  -0.34  -0.64 
Some  comments  have  already  been  made,  when  results were  discussed 
in  the  main  part  of this paper.  In  general,  it could  be  added  that 
these  long  run  substitution elasticities seem  to  make  economic  sense 
to  agricultural experts of  both  the  French  and  Italian  importing  markets. -35-
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